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Inquiring Minds Want to Know: Do Justices Tip Their 
Hands with Questions at Oral Argument in  
the U.S. Supreme Court? 
Timothy R. Johnson 
Ryan C. Black 
Jerry Goldman 
Sarah A. Treul∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 18, 2008, the United States Supreme Court heard 
arguments in District of Columbia v. Heller.1 During the proceedings, 
Tom Goldstein (in his real-time blog) posited that, 
Based just on the questioning, which can prove inaccurate, the 
Court is divided along ideological lines in Heller, with Justice 
Kennedy taking a strong view that the “operative clause” of the 
Second Amendment protects an individual right unconnected 
with militia service that guarantees the right to hunt and 
engage in self-defense.2 
Specifically, he suggested Heller would win the case and the 
Justices would recognize an individual right to bear arms.3 
 
 ∗ Timothy R. Johnson is Associate Professor of Political Science and Law, University 
of Minnesota. Ryan C. Black is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, Washington University 
in St. Louis. Jerry Goldman is Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University. Sarah A. 
Treul is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, University of Minnesota. We thank Pauline 
Kim, Al Leong, Ryan Owens, Margo Schlanger, Jim Spriggs, and participants of the 
symposium held at Washington University in St. Louis for providing useful comments and 
feedback. 
 1. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 2. Tom Goldstein, SCOTUSBLOG, The Guns Case “Live” Blog (Mar. 18, 2008), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/the-guns-case-live-blog/.  
 3. Id. 
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Interestingly, Goldstein also suggested Justice Breyer tried to garner 
a fifth vote by signaling his willingness to read the Second 
Amendment narrowly.4 Surely to Breyer’s dismay, however, none of 
the more conservative wing of the Court agreed. The bottom line for 
Goldstein, and for many who watched the Court that day, was that the 
Justices would, by the slimmest of margins, vote in favor of Heller’s 
right to bear arms. Time ultimately bore out this prediction. Indeed, 
the Court ruled 5–4 in favor of Heller.5 
Like Goldstein’s analysis of Heller, Chief Justice John Roberts 
has long thought questions posed by Justices to advocates during 
Supreme Court oral arguments can be used to predict case outcomes.6 
In fact, before he joined the Court, Roberts tested his hypothesis by 
tallying the number of questions Justices asked of advocates in a 
small sample of these proceedings.7 Specifically, he counted the 
number of questions in the first and last case from each argument 
session during the 1980 and 2003 terms (a total of twenty-eight 
cases) and found that 86% of the time, the party who received the 
most inquires from the bench ultimately lost the case.8  
Although we find his hypothesis intriguing, because the Chief 
Justice’s analysis was conducted on such a small number of cases, we 
re-test his argument on more than two thousand cases argued between 
the 1979 and 1995 terms. The Article proceeds as follows. In the next 
part we focus on what Justices and scholars have written and said 
about oral arguments generally and the role these proceedings play in 
the Court’s decision-making process. In Part II we examine the few 
existing studies that address the question we pose here. Part III lays 
out the data we use to test this hypothesis; Part IV presents our 
methodology; and Part V discusses the results. We conclude with a 
general discussion and directions for future research.  
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2783. 
 6. See Tony Mauro, When in Doubt, Look to Roberts for Outcome of Supreme Court 
Cases, LEGAL TIMES, July 11, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005556173. 
 7. Id. 
 8. John G. Roberts, Jr., Oral Advocacy and the Re-emergence of a Supreme Court Bar, 
30 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 68, 75 (2005). 
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I. THE INFLUENCE OF ORAL ARGUMENTS ON CASE OUTCOMES 
Scholars who study the Supreme Court disagree about whether 
oral arguments actually influence case outcomes. Those who 
emphasize an attitudinal approach to Justices’ decision-making 
suggest these proceedings provide no real indication of who will win 
or lose a case.9 Others posit that oral arguments provide Justices with 
information and, in some cases, even offer them a “fresh perspective” 
when it comes to making decisions.10 On this account, oral arguments 
affect case outcomes because they give Justices an opportunity to 
clear up lingering questions and to gauge what their colleagues think 
about the case.11 This line of research also demonstrates that the 
quality of oral argumentation affects Justices’ decisions.12 Indeed, by 
systematically analyzing notes Justice Harry Blackmun took about 
the quality of advocates’ arguments, scholars found that Justices 
respond to the strength of the argument before them—and often vote 
accordingly.13 
Despite these disparate perspectives, it seems reasonable to 
assume oral arguments, at the very least, have the potential to 
reinforce a Justice’s views about a case. Existing anecdotal evidence 
supports this view as Supreme Court opinions often refer to 
information gleaned during these proceedings. For example, in 
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill14 and The New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan,15 Justices Powell, Stevens, and Brennan refer to issues 
 
 9. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 280 (2002). 
 10. See, e.g., David M. O’Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics 
223 (1986). 
 11. TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 13–17 (2004); Stephen L. Wasby, Anthony A. D’Amato & Rosemary 
Metrailer, The Functions of Oral Argument in the U.S. Supreme Court, 62 Q.J. SPEECH 410, 
412 (1976). 
 12. Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James F. Spriggs II, The Influence of Oral 
Arguments on the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99, 100 (2006). 
 13. Id. at 108. Here, the authors deem that, even when controlling for the most compelling 
alternative explanation—a Justice’s ideology—and controlling for other factors affecting 
outcomes, grades Justice Blackmun assigned advocates before the Court correlate highly with a 
Justice’s final votes on their merits. Id. 
 14. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
 15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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discussed at oral arguments in their opinions.16 Building on this line 
of work, Benoit finds examples of opinions that refer to issues not 
mentioned in the litigants’ briefs but advanced by the winning party 
during oral arguments.17 Finally, Johnson argues that the infamous 
trimester scheme set in Roe v. Wade18 stems directly from a 
discussion during oral argument between attorney Sarah Weddington 
and Justice Byron White.19 He also provides systematic evidence to 
explain when Justices are most likely to invoke information from the 
oral arguments in majority opinions.20  
Ultimately, there is evidence that oral arguments provide Supreme 
Court Justices with useful information that influences their final votes 
on the merits and aids them in the opinion-writing process. These 
proceedings give Justices the opportunity to obtain information in a 
less biased manner than what is presented to them in the litigants’ or 
amici briefs.21 In fact, not only do Justices use oral arguments to 
confirm or to clarify information presented in the litigants’ briefs, but 
they might also seek new information during these proceedings to 
help them reach decisions in line with their desired outcomes.22  
Past and present Justices confirm the important role oral 
arguments play in the Court’s decision-making process. Former Chief 
Justice Rehnquist states: 
Lawyers often ask me whether oral argument “really makes a 
difference.” Often the question is asked with an undertone of 
skepticism, if not cynicism, intimating that the judges have 
really made up their minds before they ever come on the bench 
and oral argument is pretty much of a formality. Speaking for 
myself, I think it does make a difference: In a significant 
 
 16. Donald S. Cohen, Judicial Predictability in United States Supreme Court Advocacy: 
An Analysis of the Oral Argument in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 2 U. PUGET SOUND L. 
REV. 89, 135 (1978); Arthur Selwyn Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The Supreme Court, the 
Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. 
L. REV. 1187, 1208 (1975). 
 17. William L. Benoit, Attorney Argumentation and Supreme Court Opinions, 26 
ARGUMENTATION & ADVOC. 22, 32–33 (1989). 
 18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 19. JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 21–23. 
 20. Id. at 93–123. 
 21. Id. at 11–17. 
 22. Id. at 28. 
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minority of the cases in which I have heard oral argument, I 
have left the bench feeling differently about a case than I did 
when I came on the bench. The change is seldom a full one-
hundred-and-eighty-degree swing, and I find that it is most 
likely to occur in cases involving areas of law with which I am 
least familiar.23 
What Rehnquist indicates is that these proceedings offer Justices 
an opportunity to “come to terms with what are often complex legal 
and factual issues.”24 As such, they can be influential, especially 
when the Justices are less familiar with the legal area of the issue in 
the case.  
Other Justices also recognize the important role oral arguments 
play in presenting information to the Court. Justice Blackmun argues 
that “[a] good oralist can add a lot to a case and help [us] in our later 
analysis of what the case is all about . . . . Many times confusion [in 
the brief] is clarified by what the lawyers have to say.”25 Justice 
Lewis F. Powell reinforces this notion and goes so far as to say, “the 
fact is, as every judge knows . . . oral argument . . . does contribute 
significantly to the development of precedents.”26 
Clearly the Justices believe in, and scholars have demonstrated, 
the importance of oral arguments for crystallizing Justices’ 
perspectives or for convincing them to view a case through a 
different lens. The combination of the Justices’ perspectives and 
academic accounts establishes a link between these proceedings and 
Justices’ final votes on the merits. 
II. DO JUSTICES’ QUESTIONS PORTEND CASE OUTCOMES? 
Although scholars have analyzed the informational role oral 
arguments play for the Supreme Court, systematic evidence does not 
yet exist on whether Justices actually “tip their hands” during these 
 
 23. William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court 243–44 (2001). 
 24. Johnson, Wahlbeck & Spriggs, supra note 12, at 99. 
 25. Philippa Strum, Change and Continuity on the Supreme Court: Conversations with 
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 285, 298 (2000) (internal quotations omitted). 
 26. Robert L. Stern, Eugene Gressman, Stephen M. Shapiro & Kenneth S. Geller, 
Supreme Court Practice 571 (7th ed. 1993). For additional views from the bench, see Johnson, 
supra note 11, at 14–17. 
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proceedings. A plethora of anecdotal evidence suggests, however, 
that they use oral arguments as a means to communicate their initial 
thoughts regarding how they believe the Court should decide a case.27 
In this part we discuss such evidence offered from Court watchers, 
attorneys, Justices, legal scholars, and psychologists. 
Reporters who follow the Supreme Court recognize that, “[a]s the 
justices fire questions at lawyers at the court’s lectern, they also 
telegraph their views to one another.”28 In fact, Greenhouse suggests 
it may be possible to predict the outcome of cases because the “tenor 
of the argument” often reveals the Justices’ intentions.29 For instance, 
when the Court heard oral arguments in Crawford v. Marion County 
Election Board,30 she speculated the Justices’ “questioning indicated 
that a majority did not accept the challengers’ basic argument—that 
voter-impersonation fraud is not a problem.”31 For Greenhouse, the 
Justices’ behavior also meant they wanted to dismiss the case.32 
Finally, she pointed out that Justice Antonin Scalia spoke “with 
evident disapproval” during his questioning.33 
Advocates concur with reporters’ accounts that Justices may 
signal their votes during oral arguments. One past U.S. Solicitor 
General describes these proceedings as “highly stylized Japanese 
theater,” whereby “[t]he justices use questions to make points to their 
colleagues.”34 David Frederick, who argued four cases during the 
2005 term, says he considers oral arguments a “three-way” 
conversation, including “the lawyer at the lectern,” the Justice asking 
the question, and “a potentially persuadable justice.”35 
Even the Justices assert they can determine how their colleagues 
are going to decide a case based on the type and tone of questions 
they pose to attorneys during oral arguments. As Rehnquist argued:  
 
 27. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Justices Make Points by Questioning Lawyers, USA TODAY, 
Oct. 5, 2006, at 7A; Linda Greenhouse, Justices Indicate They May Uphold Voter ID Rules, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2008, at A1. 
 28. Biskupic, supra note 27. 
 29. Greenhouse, supra note 27. 
 30. 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). 
 31. Greenhouse, supra note 27. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Biskupic, supra note 27 (quoting former Solicitor General Ted Olson). 
 35. Biskupic, supra note 27. 
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But a second important function of oral argument can be 
gleaned from the fact that it is the only time before conference 
discussion of the case later in the week when all of the judges 
are expected to sit on the bench and concentrate on one 
particular case. The judges’ questions, although nominally 
directed to the attorney arguing the case, may in fact be for the 
benefit of their colleagues.36 
Despite the claims made by the press, advocates, and Justices, we 
do not know whether their conclusions are based on single cases or 
whether this behavior is consistent across cases, across Justices, or 
over time. There is some evidence to support such consistency, 
however. In her response to the Supreme Court Forecasting Project,37 
Greenhouse re-examined all her oral argument stories from the 2002 
Term and reviewed her specific predictions in sixteen cases.38 What 
she found was not a surprise to her, but it might have been to the two 
groups involved in the Project. Specifically, Greenhouse was able to 
predict the outcomes of more cases and votes of individual Justices, 
based on her assessment of questions Justices asked during the 
arguments, than either side of the Forecasting Project.39 She believes 
her advantage over the computer-based or expertise approach is that 
her predictions were “postargument predictions.”40 As one political 
scientist sees it, this “should cause many of us to reconsider 
explanations of judicial decisions that fail to take notice of these 
presentations.”41 
 
 36. REHNQUIST, supra note 23, at 244. 
 37. Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, Theodore W. Ruger & Pauline T. Kim, 
Competing Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decision Making, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 761 
(2004). In the project, two political scientists (Martin and Quinn) use a computer algorithm to 
predict the outcome of all cases from the 2002–03 Term. Id. at 761. Simultaneously, two law 
professors (Ruger and Kim) used legal experts to predict the outcomes of the same cases. Id. 
 38. Linda Greenhouse, Press Room Predictions, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 781, 782 (2004). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 782. Greenhouse might have had another advantage, as well: She only made 
predictions in cases where she was “very sure” of herself. Linda Greenhouse, Talk to the 
Newsroom: Supreme Court Reporter, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/07/14/business/media/14askthetimes.html. It remains to be seen how well she could have 
predicted cases if forced to make some prediction in all instances. 
 41. Lee Epstein, Introduction to the Symposium, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 757, 758 (2004). 
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Shullman extended the studies conducted by Greenhouse and 
Chief Justice Roberts by counting the number of questions Justices 
asked in ten oral arguments during the October 2002 Term.42 She 
then tallied the questions and divided them into categories: (1) the 
total number of questions, (2) “questions asked per case,” (3) number 
of questions asked of the party with whom the Justice voted, and (4) 
number of questions asked of the party against whom the Justice 
voted.43  
Beyond the simple counts, Shullman coded for the tone of voice, 
when the Justices made jokes, the use of hypotheticals, “and any 
other potentially relevant or interesting observations that occurred to 
me during the oral arguments.”44 More specifically, she scored each 
question with a one indicating the “most helpful questions” and a five 
being a “most hostile” question.45 Ultimately, Shullman was 
interested in the sheer number of questions posed from the bench as 
well as in the emotional content of those questions.46 Her results are 
clear: oral arguments have predictive power.47 That is, when the 
Court asks more questions of a party, and specifically more hostile 
questions, that party is more likely to lose its case.48 As this finding is 
based only on ten cases, it is evidence that calls for a more systematic 
study. 
Wrightsman goes even further by distinguishing between salient 
and non-salient cases—what he calls ideological versus non-
ideological.49 He hypothesized the questions asked should be more 
predictive of outcomes in salient cases.50 To test this hypothesis he 
analyzed the degree to which Justices’ questions were sympathetic to 
one side or not in twenty-four cases (twelve salient and twelve non-
 
 42. Sarah Levien Shullman, The Illusion of Devil’s Advocacy: How the Justices of the 
Supreme Court Foreshadow Their Decisions During Oral Argument, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 271, 273 (2004).  
 43. Id. at 274. 
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. at 273. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 278–79. 
 48. Id. at 292–93. 
 49. Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Oral Arguments Before the Supreme Court: An Empirical 
Approach 137 (2008). 
 50. Id. 
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salient) from the 2004 Term.51 The results are quite similar to 
Shullman’s conclusions.52  
On the other hand, Wrightsman’s findings contradict 
Greenhouse’s, Shullman’s, and Roberts’ work that demonstrates 
more questions asked of one party increases the likelihood that side 
will lose the case.53 Wrightsman initially chalks up this contradiction 
to the fact that each study analyzes different terms and each analyzes 
fewer than twenty-four cases.54 He then retests each of their findings 
and concludes that simple question counts are not a reliable way to 
predict outcomes.55 Rather, a combination of question counts as well 
as the number of hostile questions may be the best way to determine 
winners based on Justices’ behavior during oral arguments.56  
In the end, the works cited here, including Chief Justice Roberts’ 
own analysis, only paint a small picture. Indeed, because of the 
small-N problem, and because they do not control for alternative 
explanations, we cannot be confident that the results of any of these 
studies are fully reliable.57 Despite this shared shortfall, we believe 
the combined results are instructive and important for our analysis. 
Indeed, they show us that Justices may very well tip their hands 
during oral arguments. As Shullman concludes: “Many of the Justices 
pose hostile or argumentative questions to both sides, but it seems 
that more often they go easy on the lawyer for the party they support 
and only play devil’s advocate to the lawyer for the party they 
oppose.”58  
Based on these anecdotal findings, we seek to test a similar 
proposition. Specifically, we hypothesize that the amount of attention 
given by the Court to a particular side is inversely related to the 
likelihood it will prevail at the merits stage. That is, when the Court 
focuses more on the petitioner’s side, the Justices will be less likely 
 
 51. Id. at 138. 
 52. Shullman, supra note 42, at 278–79. 
 53. WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 49, at 140–41. 
 54. Id. at 141. 
 55. Id. at 145. 
 56. Id. 
 57. We do note that this problem is not the fault of those who have studied this 
phenomenon prior to us. Indeed, gathering data on oral arguments has not been an easy task. 
Thus, we view these analyses as path breaking for us. 
 58. Shullman, supra note 42, at 292. 
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to vote to reverse than to affirm. We tested our hypothesis using a 
large-N statistical analysis that is more generalizable than previous 
studies and also controls for potentially confounding factors related 
to the Court’s decision to reverse or affirm a lower court decision. 
III. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF ORAL ARGUMENT QUESTIONS  
1979–1995 
Our research extends previous findings by using the transcripts of 
oral arguments for all cases from 1979–1995.59 Where these studies 
analyze only a handful of cases, our data allow us to systematically 
examine more than 2,000 hours of argument and nearly 340,000 
unique questions asked by the Justices.60 That is, rather than focus on 
a small subset of cases within a term or across only a few terms, our 
comprehensive dataset allows us to make a generalizable evaluation 
of how questioning affects Court decisions. 
To gather data on these questions, we downloaded all available 
oral argument transcripts from the 1979 through 1995 Terms of the 
Court.61 We then used a basic computer script to isolate Justices’ 
questions as well as to collect additional information such as the 
length (in words) of each question. We merged these data with a 
 
 59. We have data for all cases through the 2006 Term but limit ourselves because of the 
data available for other key variables in the model. As we suggest in the discussion section, we 
will extend our analysis in a number of ways in future analyses. First, we will extend the data 
through the 2007 Term when we have data on the other covariates used in our statistical 
models. Additionally, we will conduct an individual level analysis for all cases beginning with 
the 1998 Term. That is, we will analyze the behavior of all Justices at oral arguments (even 
Justice Thomas, who rarely speaks) to determine whether there is variation in how they act 
during these proceedings and how they actually decide a case.  
 60. The term “question” might be misleading. In the transcripts, every utterance by a 
Justice is preceded by “QUESTION,” regardless of whether it is a question or not. In a case 
decided during the 2006 term, for example, Justice Breyer offered this gem: “Sorry, I have 
laryngitis. Can you hear me all right?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Hudson v. Michigan, 
547 U.S. 586 (2006) (No. 04-1360). Our argument, of course, is that these non-substantive 
statements and questions made by the Justice simply constitute random noise in our data. 
 61. Transcripts from the 1979 Term onward are available through LEXIS, though 
coverage in the early terms of the online series has some unexplained gaps. Transcripts 
covering the Terms from 1969 (beginning of the Burger Court) through 1979 are available on 
microfiche, although there are gaps in these data as well. As part of a related project, we 
ultimately plan to gather and process these data. Prior to the Court’s 1969 Term, no systematic 
transcription exists.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/9
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database used by Paul Collins in a recent article.62 The unit of 
analysis is case citation, and we include all orally argued, signed, and 
per curiam opinions. 
We initially explore several descriptive aspects of the questions 
Supreme Court Justices asked during oral arguments. The histogram 
in Figure 1 demonstrates that the data take on the familiar bell shape 
with a mean centered at 105 questions per oral argument session and 
a standard deviation of approximately 38.63 
†  Figures 1–5 do not conform to THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 
(Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005). 
We provide an additional snapshot of Justices’ questions over 
time in Figure 2. This figure shows the mean number of questions 
asked by the Court in each case within the sample. This time series 
reveals several interesting features about the data. First, note that the 
 
 62. Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807, 807–32 (2004). 
 63. This figure should be of some interest to readers. Indeed, for the vast majority of cases 
during this era, the Court only held one hour of arguments. Thus, it is clear that on average 
more than one question was asked per minute of argument. 
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minimum of the series never drops below eighty. This indicates that 
oral arguments are clearly as much about what Justices want to ask as 
they are about the arguments litigants hope to make. 
 
Given our argument, as well as existing findings, about the 
information-gathering function of oral arguments, this finding is 
intuitive. What is also interesting, but maybe unsurprising, is the 
great decrease in the number of questions asked toward the end of the 
Burger Court and then the steep increase as the Court moves into the 
Rehnquist era. Most noteworthy is the precipitous drop that occurs 
between the 1980 and 1985 Terms when the mean number of 
questions per case drops from about 120 to slightly more than 80. 
This average remains under 100 through the next term—which 
coincides with the elevation of Rehnquist to Chief Justice. There is 
then a growth trend that begins in 1987, when Justices’ inquiries 
increase from a mean of 92 to an astonishing high of 147 in 1995. 
These numbers correspond to the addition of Justices who are among 
the most prolific questioners in the history of the Court—namely 
Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/9
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Figure 3, which shows the average number of words uttered by 
the Justices during questions they ask, adds an additional layer of 
insight to our analysis of oral arguments. Not only does the mean 
number of questions asked increase as the Court made the transition 
from the Burger era to the Rehnquist era, but so too does the 
loquaciousness of the Justices while asking those questions. The 
Court used an average of just under 2,000 words per argument during 
the last 7 years of the Burger Court. This average increased to almost 
2,200 words during the first 5 years of the Rehnquist Court. Finally, 
in the second 5 years after Rehnquist took over the Court (1991–
1995), this number increases to more than 2,800 words per oral 
argument. It seems the Justices not only wanted to ask more 
questions beginning in the 1990s, but also had longer, more intricate 
questions to ask. This is consistent with our account that Justices use 
oral arguments to make as many (or more) points than the arguing 
attorneys make. 
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IV. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
While the descriptive data in the previous part are fascinating, we 
are more interested in whether the questions Justices ask indicate how 
they will vote on the merits of a case. To determine whether such an 
effect exists, we estimate two logistic regression models. Both 
models invoke the same dichotomous dependent variable of 
petitioner success. It is coded “one” if the petitioner wins and “zero” 
otherwise. 
To test our hypothesis that the side that garners the most attention 
from the bench is most likely to lose its case, we create two variables. 
In the first model, we employ Question Difference, which is the 
difference between the number of questions asked the petitioner and 
the number of questions asked the respondent. It has a mean of 0.34 
with a standard deviation of roughly 25. In the second model, we 
change out the number of questions for Words Difference, which is 
the difference between the number of words used to discuss the case 
with the petitioner versus the respondent. This variable has a mean of 
negative 26 (i.e., more words directed toward the respondent) and a 
standard deviation of roughly 550 words. Given our 
operationalization of both variables, positive numbers indicate more 
questions asked or more words used in discussion with the petitioner. 
We therefore expect the coefficients on each to have a negative sign 
in the model—meaning when there is more focus on the petitioner, 
the petitioner is less likely to win. 
Because conventional wisdom in political science still suggests 
oral arguments have little or no influence on the outcome of cases,64 
we control for a variety of alternative explanations in the two models. 
First, we include three variables to capture the effect ideology might 
have on the Court’s decision to reverse: Martin-Quinn Median 
(“MQ”) measures the ideology of the median Justice on the Court;65 
Lower Court Direction is coded “one” for a liberal lower court 
 
 64. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 9, at 280. 
 65. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 
134–53 (2002). 
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decision and “zero” otherwise; and Median Justice-Lower Court 
Congruence is an interaction of the previous two variables.  
These variables enable us to determine whether the Court is more 
likely to reverse when the lower court’s decision stands in ideological 
opposition to the preferences of the Court. When the Court is 
relatively liberal, the MQ score of the median is negative. If the 
decision of the lower court is liberal (coded as one), then the 
interaction term will be negative, which should depress the likelihood 
the Court will reverse because the median agrees with the outcome 
below. Conversely, when the median is conservative (a positive MQ 
score), the interaction term will be positive, meaning it is positively 
related with the propensity to reverse as the median is not 
ideologically satisfied with the outcome below.66 
Political scientists have also documented that when the Solicitor 
General (“SG”) participates in a case as amicus curiae, the side the 
SG supports is significantly more likely to win its case.67 To control 
for the benefit litigants might get from the federal government’s 
support, we include two variables: SG Petitioner Amicus and SG 
Respondent Amicus. The first is coded “one” if the federal 
government supported the petitioner and “zero” otherwise. The 
second is coded similarly if the government supports the respondent 
or not. In our sample of cases, the Solicitor General supported the 
petitioner 574 times and the respondent 301 times.  
Beyond the success of the federal government when it participates 
as amicus curiae, there is evidence that a litigant is more likely to win 
before the Supreme Court when it garners the support of one or more 
interest groups.68 As such, we also include two variables to account 
for this support: Petitioner Amicus Briefs and Respondent Amicus 
 
 66. When the decision below is conservative (coded as “zero”), the interaction term will 
equal zero and the effect will be accounted for statistically by the constitutive MQ term. 
 67. Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the 
U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1115 (1988); Jeffrey A. Segal, Amicus 
Curiae Briefs by the Solicitor General During the Warren and Burger Courts: A Research Note, 
41 W. POL. Q. 135, 136 (1988); Kevin T. McGuire, Explaining Executive Success in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 505, 505 (1998). 
 68. Cf. Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Interest Group Success in the Courts: 
Amicus Participation in the Supreme Court, 46 POL. RES. Q. 339, 339 (1993); Collins, supra 
note 62, at 817–21. 
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Briefs. Each of these variables is the number of briefs filed on behalf 
of the petitioner or respondent.69 
V. RESULTS 
We report the parameter estimates for our two models in Table 1. 
Taken together, these results provide clear support for our hypothesis 
that the attention Justices give to one side or the other at oral 
arguments significantly affects the outcome of a case.  
The first column in Table 1 presents the results for the model with 
the difference of questions asked to each side in a case as the main 
independent variable. The negative sign indicates that as the Court 
asks more questions of the petitioner, the Justices are less likely to 
reverse the lower court decision. This result holds even as we control 
for accepted alternative explanations for why the Justices decide for 
one side over the other. The second column shows the same 
relationship holds when we measure the attention given by the 
Justices to a particular side in the form of the difference in the total 
number of words uttered by the Justices.70 Indeed, according to 
conventional measures of model fit, the Words Difference variable 
seems to perform a bit better than its Question Difference 
counterpart. Overall, both models do a good job of predicting 
whether the Court will vote to reverse, and each achieves a modest 
reduction in error over guessing the modal outcome (i.e., reverse). 
We note also that our control variables generally performed as 
expected. This supports our argument that we have a properly 
specified model.71 
 
 69. We obtained these data from Collins, supra note 62, at 817–21. 
 70. We also experimented extensively with alternative ways of operationalizing our 
concept of interest. In particular, we re-estimated the model including both the number of 
questions or words for petitioner and respondent separately; the results are substantively the 
same. At the urging of Josuha Fischman, we also estimated models to allow for non-linearities 
in the impact of questions asked. The argument here is that parties should be worried either if 
they are asked many more questions than opposing counsel or if they are asked an exceptionally 
small number of questions overall (i.e., only three or four). We did not find support for this 
hypothesis.  
 71. The support of other outside amici also seems to affect the Court’s decision, but only 
in one direction. If the petitioner has the support of additional amici, there is an effect on the 
Court’s propensity to reverse, but it does not reach the conventional level of statistical 
significance (p>.05). As the number of amici supporting the respondent increases, however, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/9
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TABLE 1: LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF PETITIONER SUCCESS (ROBUST 
STANDARD ERROR IN PARENTHESES) 
 
Variable Name 
Questions 
Model 
Word Count 
Model 
   
Question Difference -0.021* 
(0.002) 
-- 
Words Difference -- 
 
-0.001* 
(0.0001) 
Martin-Quinn Median -0.678* 
(0.254) 
-0.655* 
(0.255) 
Lower Court Direction -0.000 
(0.237) 
-0.014 
(0.238) 
Median Justice-Lower Court Congruence -0.421 
(0.346) 
0.391 
(0.347) 
SG Petitioner Amicus 0.761* 
(0.145) 
0.730* 
(0.146) 
SG Respondent Amicus -0.852* 
(0.172) 
-0.821* 
(0.175) 
Petitioner Amicus Briefs 0.040 
(0.028) 
0.042 
(0.028) 
Respondent Amicus Briefs -0.116* 
(0.027) 
-0.120* 
(0.026) 
Constant 0.835* 
(0.180) 
0.815* 
(0.181) 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 2637 2603 
Percent Correctly Predicted 66.2 67.5 
Proportional Reduction in Error (PRE) 15.1 18.2 
Observations 2086 2086 
 
there is a significant increase in the likelihood the Justices will affirm the lower court decision. 
While we do not know for sure why amici only seem to affect decisions to affirm, one plausible 
explanation is that the Court is already predisposed to reverse, and therefore the Justices do not 
need additional support from outside parties (beyond the SG) to push them toward doing so. 
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Although the coefficients on our variables of interest appear 
small, their substantive effects are quite strong. Figure 4 presents the 
results for Question Difference. When the Justices ask an equal 
number of questions to the petitioner and respondent, there is a 0.64 
probability of reversal.72 When the Court asks 50 more questions of 
the petitioner (which is 2 standard deviations below the mean), this 
probability plummets to 0.39. Finally, the probability of reversal 
reaches an abysmally low value of 0.18 if the difference is at its 
maximum level (94 more questions asked of the petitioner than of the 
respondent). As Figure 4 indicates, alternatively, when the Court pays 
more attention to the respondent (negative numbers on the x-axis in 
Figure 4), the probability of reversal (i.e., victory for the petitioner) 
clearly increases. 
 
We also are interested in whether more than simply the number of 
questions asked from the bench affects case outcomes. Figure 5 
 
 72. To generate the probabilities, we hold all other variables at their median values. 
Predicted probabilities and their confidence intervals were generated using the spost series of 
commands in Stata 10. 
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provides such evidence. Indeed, if the difference between the words 
aimed at the parties is at its mean value (-22.11), there is a 0.64 
probability the Court will reverse. When the Court asks two standard 
deviations’ more questions of the respondent than the petitioner, this 
probability increases to 0.85. If the difference is at its maximum 
(2,423 more words used to speak to the respondent), there is a 95% 
chance of reversal. Similarly, if the Justices use more words when 
speaking to the petitioner, the probability of reversal significantly 
decreases. At 2 standard deviations above the mean (1,100 words 
more for petitioner), the probability of reversal drops to 34%. Finally, 
it drops to 8 percent when the difference in words used to speak to 
the petitioner is at the maximum difference from words used to 
address the respondent (2,644). 
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
The analysis we present here is clear: when Justices pay more 
attention to one side during oral arguments, that side is much more 
likely to lose its case. This is an important finding because it supports 
previous evidence provided by Roberts, Greenhouse, Shullman, and 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
260 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 29:241 
 
 
Wrightsman.73 Although these accounts are persuasive to us, each 
focused on fewer than thirty cases, which suggested that additional 
systematic evidence was needed to support their shared thesis. We 
provide such evidence, but questions remain.  
For instance, Greenhouse, Shullman, and Wrightsman code the 
questions asked for whether they are helpful or hostile to the attorney 
in the line of fire.74 We have not done so here. In this way our 
findings are closer to those of Chief Justice Roberts. In our next 
project on this topic, however, we explicitly address this issue. With 
the data-generating process we described above, we also gathered 
data on the linguistic/emotional nature of the questions asked and 
words used by the Justices when they ask their questions. These data, 
based on the work of Cynthia Whissell,75 will enable us to gauge the 
level of pleasantness of the words used by the Court. As such, we can 
more broadly test the notion that more helpful or hostile treatment of 
the parties affects case outcomes. 
Beyond testing the emotional content of Justices’ words, we test 
our hypothesis only on the last several years of the Burger Court and 
on the first ten years of the Rehnquist Court. Because of data 
limitations in some of our control variables, this was a necessary 
choice for this Article. But we have the oral argument data to extend 
our analysis through the 2007 term. Thus, we will be able to test the 
results on the full Rehnquist Court, the final years of the Burger 
Court, and the first few terms of the Roberts Court. As such, we will 
be able to assess whether changes in Chief Justices, as well as 
changes in natural courts, affect how questioning at oral arguments 
relates to how the Court decides. 
Next, we will conduct our analysis at the individual Justice level. 
That is, we will analyze the behavior of all Justices at oral arguments 
 
 73. Roberts, supra note 8, at 75; Greenhouse, supra note 27; Shullman, supra note 42, at 
273; WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 49, at 145. 
 74. Greenhouse, supra note 27; Shullman, supra note 42, at 273; WRIGHTSMAN, supra 
note 49, at 145. 
 75. Whissell has published dozens of articles with numerous coauthors applying her 
methodology to measure emotional content of numerous materials. See, e.g., Lee Sigelman & 
Cynthia Whissell, “The Great Communicator” and “The Great Talker” on the Radio: 
Projecting Presidential Personas, 32 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 137 (2002); Cynthia Whissell, 
Linguistic, Emotional and Content Analyses of Sexually Explicit Scenes in Popular Fiction, 7 
CAN. J. HUM. SEXUALITY 147 (1998). 
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(even Justice Thomas) to determine whether variation exists in how 
they act during these proceedings and whether such variation affects 
how they decide a case. We will utilize the transcripts from the 1998 
Term forward because these terms specifically identify each Justice 
who asks questions of the attorneys. 
Finally, we hope to go where none of these studies, including our 
own, has gone. Given the availability of the audio files for oral 
arguments, we hope to employ these data to go along with the written 
transcripts we use here.76 Like Shullman,77 we believe listening to the 
arguments will give us the best insight into how the Justices 
ultimately will act in a case. 
In the end, our analysis supports a decade-long line of research 
that demonstrates how oral arguments can and do affect decisions 
Justices make. This enables Court watchers to make predictions about 
cases, as Goldstein did in Heller, as well as for analysts like us to 
show that such anecdotal accounts are accurate and reliable. 
 
 76. For thousands of hours of audio, see Oyez: U.S. Supreme Court Media, 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2008). 
 77. Shullman, supra note 42, at 292–93. 
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